

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE:

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1. Between 1 and 7 February 1953 a number of broadcasts from Ulan Bator Radio included criticisms of civil servants and labor union officials in the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR):¹
 - a. On 1 February a broadcast criticized the "indifference and lack of loyalty on the part of poorly educated Party leaders and civil servants," citing the following examples:
 - (1) Indifference shown by the Health Center in Hulet Somon, Selenge Aimag (N 50-16, E 106-27), to the many complaints voiced by the laborers.
 - (2) The failure of Demohug, chairman of the Central Council of the Handicraft Labor Union, to give proper attention to the suggestions offered by members of the union in Emune Gobi (N 43-32, E 104-25), Dorona Gobi (N 44-58, E 109-42), Suhebagador (N 46- , E 113-) and Jabhan (N 47-45, E 96-50) Aimags concerning ways of increasing production and remedying defects in the manufacturing of tools. Demohug passed over these constructive suggestions, saying that there was a shortage of material and nothing could be done.
 - (3) In the House of Detention at Ulan Bator, 84 of the 254 prisoners were hospitalized for illness resulting from neglect on the part of Party officials and civil servants concerned.
 - b. On 3 February the failure of Party committees to hold monthly mass meetings for the discussion of Party and government policies, the world situation, production activity, Marxism, and the like for the benefit of the workers was criticized. Party committees in Bolagan (N 48-55, E 103-45), Hentei (N 47-08, E 110-55), Gobi Altai (N 46- ,

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E 96-) and Selengge Aimags had never held such meetings. In Hubsugul Aimag (N 49-33, E 100-05), Damchaj, chief secretary of the Party Committee; Dashiho, in charge of Party organization; and Shiredar, deputy chairman of the Executive Committee, had completely ignored the instruction to hold mass meetings. It was pointed out that such men were rapidly losing contact with the people they had sworn to support, and were thereby hindering the economic and cultural development of the MPR.

- c. In the broadcast of a Unen News editorial on 4 February 1953, it was stated that Lobsenbaldan, deputy chief of the Production Control Department of the Construction Control General Bureau, had failed in his duty to see that all labor regulations with regard to labor management were enforced. The resulting laxity in making full use of maximum working hours and in conforming to the labor regulations was blamed for the MPR's failure to meet the quotas set forth in the last five-year program. The attention of the Ministry of Industry was called to 1952 figures showing the percentage of production as related to the quota established by the government: Nalaiha (N 47-47, E 107-20) - Ulan Bator Light Railway, 22 percent; National Automobile Factory, 25 percent; National Automobile Service Factory, 40 percent.²
- d. In the broadcast of a Labor News³ editorial on 7 February, factory labor committees were reproached for being remiss in their duty to train new employees. In 1952 only the Nalaiha-Ulan Bator Light Railway had trained all 18 of its new employees to the point where they could qualify as technicians. At the coal mine named for the Eleventh Great National Assembly, in the Nalaiha area⁴, only 56 of the 399 workers employed during 1952 had been trained as technicians.

- 2. The stock-farmers of Suhebagador Aimag, according to a broadcast on 3 February, had accomplished all goals set by the government, with the following record of production: 108.14 percent in 1949, 111.12 percent in 1950, 120.18 percent in 1951, and 128.12 percent in 1952. As a result the government gave this aimag 50,000 tugurig in 1950, and 100,000 tugurig in 1951.⁵ The goal of 50,000,000 head of livestock by the end of the third five-year program, announced by Choibalsan in January 1950⁶, will, if it is to be reached, necessitate the payment of closer attention to prenatal protection and nutrition of animals.

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- 1. These criticisms are similar to others broadcast on 6 February 1953. One broadcast attributed the failure to fulfill quotas in such raw materials as furs, milk and sunflowers, to inadequate mass political work. Another cited misuse of raw materials, failure to utilize new equipment, misuse of transport equipment, and false entries on payrolls.
- 2. A Russian-language broadcast of this same material on 5 February indicated that the percentages given here were those by which the various establishments failed to meet their quotas, and indicated that the main trouble was with workers idling on the job. According to that broadcast, the Nalaiha-Ulan Bator narrow-gauge railway fulfilled its quota by 88 percent, the auto mechanical plant by 75 percent, and the repair base by 60 percent.

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3. This newspaper is the official labor organ in the MPR.
4. On the basis of Ulan Bator Radio broadcasts, it is estimated that there are from four to fourteen coal mines in the Nalaiha area.
5. In 1948 a tugurig was worth about US \$0.15.
6. The end of the third five-year program would be in 1956. In the spring of 1952 Tsedenbal repeated the quota of 50,000,000 head of stock in a speech before a Party Members' Rally in Arhanggai Aimag (N 47-25, E 101-30).

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